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GENERAL AVIATION VFR-INTO-IMC: Z-SCORE FILTERING OF DEMOGRAPHIC
AND PERSONALITY VARIABLES, AND THE PERSONALITY PARADOX
William Knecht
Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, FAA
Oklahoma City, OK
Does pilot personality affect risk-taking with weather?  Armchair logic says “Yes,” while data often say “No.”  In
this work, we apply the technique of z-score filtering (slice analysis) to pilot takeoff decisions made in the face of
simulated adverse weather seen at taxiway level.  Such a filtering technique might prove useful, provided emphasis
is kept to maintain experiment-wise reliability.  Statistical and methodological problems with personality data are
discussed.  The results of this particular data set showed a strong effect of weather on takeoffs, as measured by visi-
bility, cloud ceiling, and the interaction of the two.  But, despite best efforts, no strong effect of personality could be
found in this data set.  Theoretical reasons are discussed as to why it may be difficult to show that personality pre-
dicts behavior.
Introduction
Visual flight rules-flight into instrument meteorologi-
cal conditions (VFR-into-IMC) is a serious problem
in general aviation (Adams, Koonce, & Hwoschin-
sky, 2002;  Hunter, 2002a,b;  O’Hare, 1990;  O’Hare
& Owen, 2002;  O’Hare, Chalmers, & Scuffham,
2003;  Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002).  The FAA
has identified VFR-into-IMC as a leading cause of
GA fatalities, and has made it a top priority in its
2004 and 2005 Flight Plan (FAA, 2004).
It is natural to wonder if pilots’ personality influences
their risk for venturing into severe weather.  Arm-
chair  logic  says  “Of  course  it  does.”   However,  per-
sonality tests have a mixed record for being able to
predict behavior.  This has been called  “The Person-
ality Paradox”—the notion that, somehow, personal-
ity must exist and must affect behavior—yet the con-
nection is usually hard to demonstrate.
In aviation psychology, at least one author asserts
that virtually all personality research on pilots can be
shown to  have  at  least  one  fatal  flaw (Besco,  1994).
Besco cites a host of methodological errors, such as
weak validation procedures, lack of replication, ex-
perimenter biases, “potential for fakery” of re-
sponses, and lack of objective performance criteria.
Any of these flaws renders research results suspect.
There are also theoretical reasons why personality
tests  may  not  predict  behavior.   Within  the  field  of
personality research, a great “Person-Situation De-
bate” has raged for years.  A good summary of this is
given in Epstein & O’Brien (1985).  To sum up
briefly, every behavior is probably specific to some
rather narrow environmental context, or domain (We-
ber,  Blais,  &  Betz,  2002).   For  example,  roads  and
skies are two different domains.  A risky driver may
not necessarily be a risky pilot.  This means that do-
main-specific tests normed in a non-aviation domain
may not have much application to aviation.
A central theoretical issue here is whether or not
there even exist any such things as “domain-free per-
sonality traits.”  Such traits would have to be stable
and exert an influence on behavior, no matter in what
context that behavior took place.
In the present work, a number of common personality
measures were examined, as well as two demo-
graphic factors commonly assumed to correlate with
risk-taking behavior (pilot age and number of flight
hours).  The idea was to see if any of their scores, or
sub-scores could predict takeoff into adverse weather.
Method
Thirty general aviation (GA) pilots were first given an
extensive battery of common personality tests (Table
1).  Pilots were next positioned on a taxiway in a flight
simulator and were told that their aircraft was not cur-
rently certified for instrument flight, so any takeoff
would have to be VFR.  Three levels of simulated
ground visibility (V = 1, 3, 5 statute miles) and two
levels of cloud ceiling (C = 1000’, 2000’) were ma-
nipulated as independent variables in a 3x2 between-
subjects design.  Each pilot saw one V,C combination
and then had to decide whether or not to take off and
fly in that weather.  Logistic regression modeling was
then conducted to see if personality test scores could
predict actual yes/no takeoff decisions.
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Instrument High score implies Reference
Aviation Safety Attitude Scale high history of aviation risk behavior Hunter, 1995, 2002a, 2002b
Anxiety Sensitivity Index high scores indicate high anxiety Peterson & Reiss, 1994
Barratt Impusiveness Scale V10 high impulsivity Barratt, 1975
Eysenck Impulsivity Scale high impulsivity Eysenck & Eysenck, 1964,1985
Hazardous Events Index high history of aviation risk behavior Hunter, 2002b
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire high degree of specified trait Patrick, Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002
Risk Orientation Questionnaire high risk tolerance Rohrmann, 2002
Sensation Seeking Scale high desire for stimulus-seeking Zuckerman, 1994
State-Trait Anxiety Scale high anxiety Spielberger, 1983
Table 1. List of personality tests examined in this study.
Results
Predictably, the single most significant groupwise
factor in pilots’ decisions turned out to be the weather
itself.  Seventy percent of pilots chose to stay on the
ground.  Contrast this with an expected rate of 100%
takeoffs, had there been unlimited visibility and ceil-
ing (p<<.0001 by binomial expansion, assuming a
highly conservative 28/30 takeoff ratio).
Throughout the regression analysis, despite extensive
attempts to predict takeoff through seemingly sensible
combinations of demographic and personality factors,
no model ever seemed to explain much more outcome
variance than did weather all by itself (about 50%).
Was this to say that pilot personality did not matter?
Or was it was more likely that each pilot had a
unique, individual set of motivations and propensi-
ties—a “story,” if you will—but that there were so
many individuals with so many different stories that
it made groupwise analysis difficult?
To try to get at these individual stories, predictor
scores were converted to z-scores, and then threshold-
filtered to try to reveal patterns of predictors whose
absolute values were high relative to the group mean.
This kind of slice analysis has potential as an analyti-
cal technique, particularly in cases where we wish to
tell stories about a relatively small number of indi-
viduals.   However,  we  do  need  to  keep  in  mind  the
effect that looking at many predictors will have on
experiment-wide (familywise) error (Keppel, 1982).
These potentials and issues are best seen through
example.  In this experiment, two pilots chose to take
off into the very worst weather presented (1 mile
ground visibility plus 1000’ cloud ceiling).  What, if
anything, set these two pilots apart from the other 28?
Using slice analysis, an initial z-threshold value (θz)
of 3.3 standard deviations was established.  This theta
value corresponded to the Bonferroni correction nec-
essary to maintain familywise error at α = .05 (two-
tailed), despite the examination of 28 predictors for
two subjects.  The corrected α was derived from the
desired familywise α divided by the number of ex-
aminations planned (.05 / (2*28) = .0009.  The z-
level necessary to achieve that new α was zcritical =
±3.3, which yielded an area of .0009 under both tails
combined.  This can be cross-checked by expanding
the binomial (α,1-α)n for n=56 factors and noting that
(1-.0009)56 =  .95  =  1-α, which equals the chance of
zero Type 1 errors (the chance of finding no statisti-
cal “significances” where none truly exist).
As Figure 1 illustrates, θz = 3.3 was a very stringent
criterion.  All that remained after thresholding was a
single surviving predictor for a single pilot (the first
two variable slots merely represented visibility, and
ceiling, which were not thresholded).  This surviving
predictor was the Hazardous Events Index (HEI)
score, which measured pilots’ past history of hazard-
ous encounters.  So it did make sense that an elevated
HEI score could relate to risk-taking in this scenario.
At this point,  it  made some sense to try relaxing the
familywise α to  assess  how  this  would  trade  off  in
terms of increased information.  Relaxing to α = .10
gave a θz = 3.1.  That still left 90% assurance that the
overall analysis was reliable, which still translated to
a best guess of zero expected overall Type I errors.
This produced at least one extra piece of information
about S 2031, as Figure 2 shows.
Unfortunately, the surviving predictor was a below-
average Rohrmann Risk Orientation Questionnaire,
Risk Propensity index score (ROQ-P).  Having a low
propensity for risk was inconsistent with this pilot’s
actual takeoff into the very worst conditions.  So that


















































































































Figure 1. Predictors thresholded at θz =  3.3.   This
criterion was so rigorous that it failed to show any-
thing other than an elevated Hazardous Events Index

















































































































Figure 2. θz = 3.11.  Familywise reliability is .90,
expected Type I errors still = 0.
To carry this filtering technique to its conclusion, θz
was finally lowered all the way to 1.5.  This provided
only slightly more information, and led familywise
reliability to plunge to .0003, with seven expected



















































































































Figure 3. θz = 1.5. Little information is gained, de-
spite a great loss in reliability.
Discussion
The implication this methodology has for analysis is
mixed.   On  the  one  hand,  it  makes  it  quite  easy  to
imagine a “story” for each pilot—some pattern of
predictor scores that might explain why that pilot
acted as he or she did in some circumstance.  On the
other hand, elements of these stories may not be reli-
able or even make logical sense.  In fact, as we can
see with this data set, by the time we lower our reli-
ability threshold (θz) to a level where we can see
emerging patterns, our familywise error rate is in
trouble.  That means that, under certain circum-
stances, we could have gotten strong-looking—but
counterfeit—patterns simply from random numbers.
So does this mean that pilot personality had nothing
to  do  with  pilot  behavior?   Not  necessarily.   What
seemed more likely was that:
1. Aviation-specific versions of most of these
predictors may be needed.
2. Even if the right predictors were tracked,
scores may not have differed greatly enough
from the mean to statistically distinguish
themselves from noise.  However, their con-
comitant traits might still have exerted influ-
ence on behavior.
3. Combinations of traits may have acted syn-
ergistically to create a “whole greater than
the sum of the parts.”
Point 1 concerns the notion that risk can be domain-
and situation-specific.  If so, then we would need
aviation-specific personality tests, normed on pilots







































































































































Figure 4. θz = 1.  Dense patterns of information
emerge.  These may have small amplitude, but might
still exert true effect on takeoff.
Figure 4 speaks to Point 2.  As this illustrates, by
greatly relaxing θz we can visualize how each subject
may very well have a unique personality profile.  But
these patterns do seem almost all over the map.  The
problem is one of reliably demonstrating patterns
when most of them lie “submerged” below a statisti-
cal threshold elevated by the number of factors
being examined.
Points 2 and 3, if true, would make the study of pilot
personality very difficult, if not impossible.  We
could call all this part of the mathematical basis for
the Personality Paradox.
First, we have a theoretical situation loosely analo-
gous to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (the im-
possibility of simultaneously knowing a particle’s
momentum and position).  The act of looking for
meaningful patterns—examining many factors simul-
taneously—decreases the statistical reliability of each
score to the point where the information becomes
untrustworthy.  We seemingly cannot have our cake
and eat it too.
Second, and equally bad, if synergy does exist be-
tween variables, then the situation worsens because
of a possible combinatorial explosion.  Equation 1















So,  if  our  personality  test  has,  say,  11  factors,  then
there are 55 ways we could make pairs, 165 ways for
triplets, 330 for quadruplets, and so forth.  If, truly,
“the action is in the interaction,” then, given these
kinds of numbers, we run headlong into impossibly
strict criteria for limiting familywise error.
In short, we may be statistically caught between a
rock and a hard place.  The Personality Paradox may
be an inevitable mathematical consequence of com-
binatorics.
Conclusions
It is difficult to dismiss the intuitive notion that “right
stuff” personality plays a major role in pilot decision
making. A logical next step in pursuing this issue
might be to use a “Big Five” OCEAN approach.  This
would involve testing five commonly accepted fac-
tors of Trait Theory: openness to experience, consci-
entiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neu-
roticism.  Popkins (2004) gives an excellent critical
review of this approach.  Since five is not a very
large number, this would go a long way toward re-
ducing combinatorial effects.
Yet we are faced with a burgeoning suspicion that it
may be difficult to identify most of the personality
factors that putatively affect behavior, even after the
fact, let alone before it.  There do appear to be so
many individuals with so many different “stories”
that mathematical arguments arise that indicate
groupwise analysis and behavioral prediction on the
basis of personality will always be difficult.
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